From Jugaad to Systematic Innovation: The Challenge for India From Jugaad to Systematic Innovation: The Challenge for India; by Rishikesha T Krishnan; 2010; Publisher: The Utpreraka Foundation, Bangalore, India; pp: 197; price: Rs 400/-; hard cover; Book http://jugaadtoinnovation.blogspot.com by Rao, A.S.
IIMB Management Review (2011) 23, 64e66INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT 
BANGALORE 
IIMB 
ava i lab le at www.sc iencedi rect .com
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ie r . com/ loca te / i imbBOOK REVIEWSFrom Jugaad to Systematic Innovation: The Challenge for
India; by Rishikesha T Krishnan; 2010; Publisher: The
Utpreraka Foundation, Bangalore, India; pp: 197; price:
Rs 400/-; hard cover; Book http://jugaadtoinnovation.
blogspot.com
Industrial policy is back in fashion. The Economist (5th
August, 2010) 1analysed this trend and cited several instances
of government intervention. The US has pumped billions into
banks and car makers, taking large stakes. President Barack
Obama’s stimulus package has earmarked billions for inno-
vation in sectors such as renewable energy, high speed rail
and advanced vehicles. Japan’s prime minister wants to
create a new ‘Japan Inc’, deepening the links between
business and state and its Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI) has announced a strategy to combat the
‘increasingly aggressive’ industrial policies of the US, Britain,
China, France, Germany and South Korea. France has vowed
to lift manufacturing output by a quarter over the next five
years and other European nations are not far behind with
their stimulation packages.
Historical evidence shows that industrial, trade and
technology policies were the main ingredients in the indus-
trial success ofWestern economies. The interventions ranged
from the frequent use of import duties or even import ban for
infant industry protection to industrial promotion through
monopolies, grants, cheap supplies from government facto-
ries, subsidies, public- private partnerships and direct state
intervention. But the results are a mixed bag. India’s License
Raj had a negative impact on the competitiveness of its
industry but Taiwan’s innovation based import substitution
was a stunning success.
To appreciate the book under review, one has to view
India’s economic and industrial development in historical
perspective. India has evolved significantly in the past two
decades from an almost closed planned economy to one of
the most widely acknowledged examples of the power of
knowledge driven growth.0970-3896 ª 2010 Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. All
rights reserved. Peer-review under responsibility of Indian Institute
of Management Bangalore.
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1 http://www.economist.com/node/16741043.Against the background of scarce capital and a weak
entrepreneurial base, the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution
assigned the state with the predominant and direct
responsibility for industrial development. Several industries
such as steel, atomic energy, power and coal were reserved
for the public sector. Since capital was scarce, the govern-
ment considered excess capacity to be a waste of resources
and hence licensed limited capacity. Many industries were
set up at capacities that were a fraction of the ‘minimum
economic’ by global standards. This created a demand for
low capacity appropriate technology. However, the Indus-
trial Policy did not remain static and was changed in 1973,
1977 and1980, and radically altered in 1990. From licensing
maximum capacities, the government moved to prescribing
minimum capacities in the 80s and in the 90s, it abolished
industrial licensing for all industries except for a short list of
industries related largely to security and strategic concerns.
Industries are now being encouraged to set up global size
plants, which would make them globally competent.
In the initial period, in an attempt to encourage local
players and to regulate the market, the role of multinational
companies (MNCs) was limited under the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, with restrictions being placed in their areas
of operation and dividend outflows. While the government
wanted MNCs in high technology areas, most MNCs wanted to
invest in consumer products. The period of mutual suspicion
was over by the 90s and it is now acknowledged that Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) would bring in the advantages of
technology transfer, marketing expertise, modern manage-
rial techniques and new avenues for promoting exports. Now
there are practically no restrictions on FDI.
It was with independence that India started seriously on
the path of industrialisation and with most technologies not
being available locally, therewas no alternative but to import
technologies.Anacute foreignexchange crisis in the 60s led to
the imposition of several restrictions on technology imports,
the only exceptions being made for capital goods in high
technology industries such as textiles, steel production, coal
mining, machine tools, fertilizers etc. Consumer products
were manufactured by small and medium scale firms using
local technology which in most cases were imitations of
foreign products. With the areas and terms for buying foreign
technology now being liberalised, the selection and buying of
technology is left to the entrepreneur.
India was among the first developing countries to come up
with a science policy. The Scientific Policy Resolution (1958)
recognised the utility of science for development and artic-
ulated theaims clearly. TheTechnologyPolicy picks upwhere
the Science Policy leaves off. It is not limited to research
and development but also focuses on the rapid application
Book Reviews 65of new ideas. In the Technology Policy Statement of 1983
the Government of India enunciated the Technology Policy
emphasising technological self-reliance. The basic objective
of the Technology Policy was the development of indigenous
technology and efficient absorption and adaptation of
imported technology appropriate to national priorities and
resources. While the Science and Technology policies were
clearly enunciated, the Science and Technology Policy of
2003, despite declarations such as the innovation decade,
left a lot to be desired by way of priorities and action plans.
Prof Rishikesha Krishnan provides several policy
prescriptions with regard to innovation. The innovation
systems of different countries have evolved in different
ways because of historical, political, cultural, social and
economic factors and philosophies. There is no ‘ideal’ way
of organising the innovation system. After an exhaustive
study of industrial innovation systems abroad and in India,
the author raises the issue: Why have Indian companies
failed to develop a more robust set of industrial innovation
capabilities? Is it because of the lack of the right inputs? Or
do Indian companies simply lack the capacity to innovate?
The author surveys the political economy of the Indian
industrial policy and concludes that the innovation policy is
an orphan as in the government structure, the Science and
Technology (S&T) ministry is on the periphery of decision
making. Of three strands of innovation comprising innova-
tion ecology namely classical innovation from researchers
and scientists, innovations from the ’creative class’ and the
business world, 2 the S&T ministry has a grip on only the
first and that too has loosened with high impact R&D
moving from labs to in-house R&D units and now to the R&D
subsidiaries of multinationals.
As a way ahead, Prof Rishikesha Krishnan outlines
several options;
 Create a critical mass of new, innovative, technology
driven firms
 Enhance technological capability of existing micro,
small and medium enterprises (MSMEs)
 Transform large private companies
 Create new incentive systems for universities and other
institutions of higher education
 Continue dynamic reform of public R&D organisations
 Change structure of government involvement in sup-
porting industrial R&D
 Create supportive societal conditions for industrial
innovation.
Moving away from romantic notions of ‘jugaad’ innova-
tions, the author calls for a systematic approach to inno-
vation. Innovation led growth is on a slippery territory d
just a few sites produce most of the world’s innovations.
Innovation remains difficult without a critical mass of
financiers, entrepreneurs and scientists often nourished by
world class universities and global corporations. Since
science and technology are founded on rigour and quality,
it will be a mistake to be distracted by sheer quantity. It is
critical that we focus more diligently on the quality of the
science and engineering workforce we produce, find new2 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/213798-
1278955272198/ThreeStrandsofInnovation.pdf.ways to increase effectiveness of current funding and adopt
modern approaches to collaborate.
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What must companies do to survive ‘the Great Disruption’?
That is the question that Scott Anthony, the president of
Innosight, sets out to answer in this book. What Anthony
means by the term ‘theGreat Disruption’ is simple: we live in
an era when competitive dynamics is being defined by the
ability of new firms to both strategically ‘disrupt’ and
‘redefine’ the notion of quality by shifting focus to new
dimensions of performance. This is Anthony’s third book on
innovation from Harvard Business School Press; what inter-
ests him however is not innovation per se, but the process of
‘disruptive innovation’. Anthony’s interest in the theory and
practice of disruptive innovation is linked to the idea that it
is not enough for a company or the market leader to be
‘better’ than the competition since hard-won competitive
advantages can be easily lost. It is therefore important to
work at ‘changing the game’ rather than aim to produce
a better product or service. The notion of the Great
Disruption refers then to the idea that companies cannot
take the rules of the game for granted anymore, but must
demonstrate agility when disrupted by the competition. As
long as the game was about getting better and better, there
was clarity on what must be done; once disruptive innova-
tion became necessary to derive a competitive advantage,
the rules of the game were not clear anymore.
What is it that Anthony hopes to do with this book? ‘This
book’, he writes, ‘is intended to be a guide for executives
and innovators seeking to seize the silver lining in today’s
difficult times, for strategists and investors trying to spot
industry winners and losers, and for individuals thinking
about how to tighten their own belts or reinvent them-
selves’ (p.21). The strategies for managing the Great
Disruption discussed here should make it possible for
companies to seize the ‘ample opportunities’ that are
available e provided they learn to ‘prune prudently’ (p.23).
What this means is that companies must decide what the
trade-off is between funding disruptive innovations vis-a-vis
existing businesses. It is not easy to do so however using the
traditional models of valuation that most companies use to
make funding decisions. Themain criterion should be to close
‘businesses that lack both potential and option value’. The
urgency of the situation arises from the fact that if a company
does not take a proactive approach to disruptive innovation,
it can become the victim of a disruptive attack. The reasons
for this are poorly understood since companies derive satis-
faction fromthe fact that theyeitherhave thebestproductor
